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Abstract—Deep neural networks are becoming popular and
important assets of many AI companies. However, recent studies
indicate that they are also vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
Adversarial attacks can be either white-box or black-box. The
white-box attacks assume full knowledge of the models while
the black-box ones assume none. In general, revealing more
internal information can enable much more powerful and efficient
attacks. However, in most real-world applications, the internal
information of embedded AI devices is unavailable, i.e., they are
black-box. Therefore, in this work, we propose a side-channel
information based technique to reveal the internal information
of black-box models. Specifically, we have made the following
contributions: (1) we are the first to use side-channel information
to reveal internal network architecture in embedded devices;
(2) we are the first to construct models for internal parameter
estimation; and (3) we validate our methods on real-world devices
and applications. The experimental results show that our method
can achieve 96.50% accuracy on average. Such results suggest
that we should pay strong attention to the security problem
of many AI applications, and further propose corresponding
defensive strategies in the future.
Index Terms—Deep learning, machine learning, model identi-
fication, side-channel attack, adversarial attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENTLY, deep neutral networks (DNNs) have beenthe focus of research and widely used in many artificial
intelligence (AI) related areas [1], such as image classifica-
tion, object detection, video recognition, and natural language
processing etc. Many DNNs are deployed and implemented on
embedded devices, e.g., robots, self-driving cars, and smart-
phones etc, or to solve specific industrial tasks like pearl clas-
sification [2], [3], fault diagnosis [4]–[6] and soft sensors [7],
[8]. With the miniaturization of DNNs and the development of
AI chips [9], [10], DNNs on embedded hardware are becoming
increasingly common and meanwhile, vulnerable to various
attacks. In this work, we demonstrate, for the first time, a
powerful side-channel attack (SCA) based technique to the
embedded DNN devices which has the potential to reveal
critical internal information of DNNs.
Currently, it was found that DNNs are vulnerable to ad-
versarial attacks in the form of tiny perturbations [11]. In
other words, by adding small controllable noises to the input,
we can mislead the network to generate incorrect results.
This poses a security problem for the application of DNN,
e.g., attacks on road signs [12] may bring a safety hazard to
autonomous driving; attacks on face attributes [13], [14] may
invalidate many face recognition applications; and attacks on
robot vision [15] may challenge the application of robots. The
mainstream attacking models include black-box and white-box
attacks [16]. The difference lies at the structural knowledge of
the network. The black-box attack assumes no prior knowledge
of the neural network model [17], [18]. While the white-
box attack, on the other hand, relies upon the complete
structure information, including both network architecture and
parameter values [19]–[21]. Apparently, the white-box is much
more powerful and resilient than the black-box model at
the cost of feasibility, i.e., most of the embedded devices
are considered as black-box. To leverage this tradeoff and
significantly improve the attack performance, it is required to
obtain additional neural network information for the embedded
hardware.
SCA is a powerful tool to obtain hardware information [22],
[23]. It takes advantage of side-channel signals, such as power
consumption, computing time, and electromagnetic radiation
etc., to reveal hidden information inside the embedded hard-
ware [24]. Traditionally, it is used to extract the secretive
keys during the encryption/decryption process. However, since
during the computation process of the DNNs, the side channel
information shows strong correlations to the network structure
and its parameters, we envision that SCA can be used for
embedded AI devices and reveal their network architectures
and even the corresponding parameters. In other words, we
intend to use SCA to open the black-box of DNNs, which
can facilitate adversarial attacks by transforming a black-box
attack to an at least partial white-box, or gray-box, attack. Note
that, as a Chinese aphorism says “the law of defending a city is
born from siege; if you want to defend well, you must attack
well”, we hope this study of SCA on DNNs could provide
useful insights for researchers to propose defensive strategies
in the future to better protect AI devices.
In this work, we propose a SCA based technique to explore
the network structure and parameter properties, which might
be used for subsequent attacks. First, we collect the device
power consumption traces. Then we use machine learning
techniques to identify the structure and parameter values. Our
technique is based on the assumption that the AI device
employs existent architectures and pre-trained parameters,
which is appropriate for many real-world applications [25]–
[27]. Specifically, we have made the following contributions.
1) We are the first to employ the SCA method to identify
the DNN structures in embedded devices.
2) We are also the first to use SCA to estimate the sparsity
of DNN parameters. Based on the sparsity features, we
derive the pre-trained parameter values.
3) We validate the effectiveness of our techniques on a real-
world embedded platform.
To perform SCA, we use the power reading measurement
during DNN processing. The experiment results show that our
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
10
40
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
1 J
ul 
20
19
2technique can achieve more than 96.5% attacking success rate.
The remaining parts of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II introduces the related works. Section III describes
basic knowledge of DNN structures and parameters. Sec-
tion IV presents the underlying theories and details of our
technique. Section V shows the experiment setup and results.
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The current work is related to deep neural networks, em-
bedded AI hardware, and side channel attacks, which will be
briefly reviewed.
A. Deep neural networks
In this work, we aim to identify the internal DNN archi-
tecture [28], [29]. In the real-world applications, several DNN
architectures are widely used. For example, AlexNet [30] is
popular for its success in the 2012 ImageNet competition [31].
GoogleNet [32] significantly increases the depth of DNN.
ResNet [33] beats human experts in image recognition. VG-
GNet [34] and RCNN [35] are widely used for their break-
through in object detection. There are also networks specific to
mobile applications [9], [10]. Currently, most engineers design
their AI product based on the exist architectures. Therefore,
by identifying the existent popular architectures, we expect to
be able to break a large portion of such AI products.
B. Embedded AI hardware
Embedded AI devices are becoming more and more pop-
ular recently, and many AI specific embedded products are
announced. Cambricon developed a series of embedded AI
hardware based on the Diannao architecture [36], [37]. They
can be used as AI processing units and handle jobs such as
face recognition and object detection etc. Intel proposed the
Movidius Myriad X Visual Processing Unit (VPU), a deep
learning based visual AI core to accelerate applications such
as drones, smart cameras, and VR/AR helmets, etc. Huawei re-
leased Ascend series of AI processing units which are designed
for full range scenarios. Nvidia and Facebook announced plans
for DNN processing units. Google also designed dedicated
hardware Tensor Processing Units (TPU) for its AI services.
In this work, we develop a raspberry pi based experimental
platform. As an Arm cortex based system, Raspberry Pi
shares the common architecture of many existent devices.
Therefore, the experiments performed on this system can be
easily migrated to other similar systems.
C. Side-channel attack
Side-channel attack (SCA) is a very powerful tool in attack-
ing encrypted systems. Traditionally, the encryption process
is considered as a perfect black-box. However, in real-world
applications, information can be leaking [24]. Initially, SCA
is focused on differential power analysis [23] and timing at-
tacks [22]. Later, more side-channel information and attacking
methods are developed. Yuval et al. [38] propose a cache based
SCA to extract the private encryption keys. Genkin et al. [39]
extract full 4096-bit RSA keys successfully using the computer
audio information during the decryption process. By cloning
the USIM cards, Liu et al. [40] can recover the encryption key
and other information contained from the 3G/4G USIM cards.
Defense against SCA is also well studied [41].
Naturally, this powerful attacking method can be applied to
reveal DNN architectures or some related information. Duddu
et al. [42] used timing side channels to infer the depth of the
network; Batina et al. [43] show that side channel attacks can
roughly obtain information on activation functions, number
of network layers, number of neurons, number of output
categories, and weights in the neural network; Another close
work is to obtain the input image by analyzing the power trace
in the first convolution layer [44]. So far, the current work is
the first attempt trying to reveal the internal DNN architectures
of embedded devices using power SCA.
III. PRELIMINARY
In this section, we introduce the basics of DNN and the
corresponding parameters.
A. DNN architectures
The mainstream DNN architectures typically share some
common and critical components, e.g., in visual applications,
convolutional layers are usually used to extract features, while
fully connected layers are used for classifications. In this
paper, we mainly focus our research on the computer vision
related DNN models. Fig. 1 shows the typical components,
including convolutional layers, pooling layers, fully connected
layers, and activation function. The convolution layers use
various convolution kernels to filter the images. The pooling
layer is essential to reduce the layer dimensions. The fully
connected layers consist of fully connected neurons. The
activation function is typically a non-linear function added to
the output of each neuron.
One critical observation is that different components require
different computational cost. Therefore, different architectures
have different power consumption patterns, which makes DNN
architectures vulnerable to SCAs.
B. Parameters and sparsity
Parameters, or neuron weights and biases, define a DNN
model. Typically, a DNN model is first trained using back
propagation. During the training phase, the parameters are con-
tinuously updated. Then in the inferring phase, the parameters
combined are used to perform various classification operations.
Training a DNN from scratch requires numerous computation
resources and time [30], [45], [46]. Therefore, in real-world
applications, people usually derive the DNN based on pre-
trained parameters on existent models.
Another problem for embedded AI applications is that the
computational resources on embedded platforms are very lim-
ited. To address this problem, various parameter pruning tech-
niques were proposed. Han et al. [47] deeply compressed neu-
ral networks by pruning and trained quantization and Huffman
coding and [48] proposed an energy efficient inference engine,
3filter2
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(a) convolutional layer (b) pooling layer (c) fully connected layer (d) activation function
Fig. 1. Some typical components of DNNs. (a) The convolution layer performs a series of convolution operations on the image or feature maps by convolution
kernels; (b) the pooling layer generally includes average pooling and maximum pooling; (c) the fully connected layer implements a fully connected linear
operation of neurons; and (d) an activation function, which is always nonlinear, is added to the output of other typical neural network layers to make the
model more powerful.
which infers the compressed network model and acceleration
vector multiplication by weight sharing. Yu et al. [49] pro-
posed the Neuron Importance Score Propagation algorithm to
better reduce redundant connections. Kang et al. [50] proposed
a pruning scheme for convolutional neural networks (CNN)
running on accelerators. Lin et al. [51] proposed a novel global
and dynamic pruning scheme to prune redundant filters for
CNN acceleration. The basic idea of parameter pruning is
to set some unimportant weights to be zero. Therefore, the
computational cost is reduced while the performance of the
whole network retains. Parameter sparsity is defined as the
proportion of zero-valued parameters. Obviously, for different
DNN models with the same architecture, power consumptions
can vary significantly because of different parameter sparsity.
In that case, other than the DNN architecture, it is possible
that the device power traces can be used to reveal the actual
weights of a large portion of pre-trained neurons.
IV. SIDE CHANNEL POWER BASED TECHNIQUE
In this section, we present our technique in detail. Specifi-
cally, we first develop power consumption theories and models
on various DNN layers. Then, we discuss the impact of
parameter sparsity on DNN power cosumptions. Finally, we
describe our SCA based technique.
A. DNN power models
First, we build power computation models for each kind of
neural network layer.
1) Convolutional layer: As shown in Fig .1 (a), convolu-
tional layer typically consists of many filters and is used to
extract features at different level of abstractions. Specifically,
the convolutional operation can be described by
ai,j =
C−1∑
d=0
F−1∑
m=0
F−1∑
n=0
ωm,nxi+m,j+n + ωb, (1)
where ai,j represents the output of a single convolutional filter,
xi,j represents the input value, C represents the number of
input channels, F represents the filter kernel size, and ωm,n
and ωb represent the parameter weights and bias, respectively.
Therefore, according to Eq. (1), the total operation number of
a single convolutional filter is calculated by{
Nmul = C × F × F
Nadd = C × F × F,
(2)
where Nmul is the number of multiplication operations and
Nadd is the number of addition operations. Assuming that the
input size is C×L×W , the filter stride is S, and the number
of convolutional kernels is N , the total operation number of
the convolutional layers is calculated by
Ncov = fcov(C,L,W, S,N, F )
=
{
Nmul = (
L
S × WS )× (N × C × F × F )
Nadd = (
L
S × WS )× (N × C × F × F ).
(3)
Thus, the power consumption of a single convolutional layer
can be derived as
Pconv(C,L,W, S,N, F ) =
pmLWNCF
2
S2
+
paLWNCF
2
S2
,
(4)
where pm and pa are the average multiplication and addition
operation power consumptions, respectively, of the device. It
is observed that the power consumption of the convolution
layer is strongly correlated to the input and kernel sizes, i.e.,
the convolution layer architectures.
2) Pooling layer: To reduce the growing feature dimensions
without hurting the performance, there is typically a pooling
layer between two consecutive convolutional layers, as shown
in Fig. 1 (b). Without loss of generalization, we employ the
maximum pooling method here. Thus, the total number of
operations for the pooling layer is
Npl = fpl(C,L,W, S, F ) = C × L
S
× W
S
× F × F. (5)
where (C,L,W ) is the input size, S is the pooling stride, and
F is the pooling window size, for simplicity. Therefore, the
power consumption of a pooling layer is calculated by
Ppl(C,L,W, S, F ) =
pcCLWF
2
S2
, (6)
4where pc represents the average comparison operation power
consumption of the device. Eq. (6) indicates that the pooling
layer power consumption is also largely determined by the
DNN architecture.
3) Fully connected layer: After the convolution layer and
pooling layer, DNNs typically use fully connected layers, as
shown in Fig. 1 (c), to process the extracted features. The fully
connected layers consists of several layers of fully connected
neurons. The operation number of a single fully connected
layer can be calculated by
Nfc = ffc(X,Y ) =
{
Nmul = X × Y
Nadd = X × Y,
(7)
where X is the number of input neurons and Y is the number
of output neurons. Thus, the power of fully connected layer
can be derived as
Pfc(X,Y ) = pmXY + paXY. (8)
4) Activate function: For each neuron, its value should be
judged by an activation function, as shown in Fig. 1 (d). There
are many different types of activation functions, such as relu,
tanh, sigmod, and softmax, etc. The total number of operations
for the activation function is calculated by
computeac = fac(C,L,W ) = α× C × L×W, (9)
where α is the operational coefficient which is determined
by the specific type of the activation function. Therefore, the
power consumption of the activate function can be derived as
Pac(C,L,W ) = pacαCLW, (10)
where pac is the power consumed by one operation in ac-
tivation function. In general, the power consumption of the
activation function is linear to the inputs and relatively small
compared to other layers.
5) Overall power consumption: So far, we have built the
power consumption models for the major components of mod-
ern DNNs. There are many other special operations. However,
their computational cost is usually negligible. Therefore, in
this work, we construct our general power model based on
Eq.(4), (6), (8), and (10). Fig. 2 shows a simple example of
our model. This simple DNN consists of five convolutional
layers, three pooling layers, three fully connected layers, and
common activation functions. The operation of each layer can
be represented by our corresponding power model.
It is observed that the variation of DNN architecture can
have significant impact on the power consumptions. Thus, the-
oretically we can identify the specific architecture by analyzing
and classifying the operational power traces.
B. Parameter sparsity model
In the previous section, we have generalized the models to
identify the DNN architectures. In order to further improve
the efficiency of adversarial attacks on DNN, it is desirable
to derive the actual parameters, such as weights and biases,
of each neuron. However, unlike the architecture, the power
variation of different parameter values is very insignificant,
unless it is zero. it is observed that many AI models use at least
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣(3,224,224,96,11)
𝑃𝑎𝑐(96,55,55)
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𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣(384,13,13,1,384,3)
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𝑃𝑎𝑐(4096,1,1)
𝑃𝑓𝑐(4096,1000)
𝑃𝑎𝑐(1000,1,1)
Fig. 2. The power model of the Alexnet. The Alexnet consists of five
convolutional layers, three pooling layers, three fully connected layers, and
some common activation functions.
partial pre-trained parameters. Moreover, some advanced AI
chips have hardware-level parameter pruning to improve the
computational efficiency while maintaining the performance.
Combining the pre-training and parameter pruning techniques,
it is possible to further identify the actual parameter values.
It is assumed that the pre-training and pruning techniques
for various models are known to the attackers. Thus, during
the operation of the AI device, different pre-trained parameter
sets with various pruning method can generate unique sparsity
in the neurons, which can lead to differentiable power traces.
Parameter pruning mainly occurs in the convolution and the
fully connected layers. The power consumption of the con-
volution layer and that of the fully connected layer are thus
changed to
P
′
conv(C,L,W, S,N, F ) = λ1Pconv(C,L,W, S,N, F ),
(11)
P
′
fc(X,Y ) = λ2Pfc(X,Y ), (12)
where λ1, λ2 ∈ (0, 1] are the parameter sparsity coefficients
of the convolution layer and the fully connected layer, re-
spectively. When no pruning operation is applied, the values
of λ is simply set to 1. Different pre-training parameters
combined with different parameter pruning techniques can lead
to significant power variations. Thus, this observation can be
used to identify the actual parameter values of DNN model in
the AI device, which makes it even more vulnerable.
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Fig. 3. The framework of our SCA on DNN models. We collect voltage and current data while the AI device is running a model, get the power features,
and then establish the classifier to identify the DNN structure and sparsity, so as to realize the attack.
C. General power model
Based on the above DNN architecture and parameter power
models, we build our general power model to classify the
specific architecture and the corresponding parameter values.
It includes training and testing phases.
The framework of our SCA on DNN models is shown in
Fig 3. We continuously collect voltage and current data while
the AI device is running a model, calculate the power and
power features to form a power-feature data set. We then
randomly choose some data to train a classifier, and input
the rest of the power-feature data into the trained classifier
to get the model structure and the parameter sparsity. More
specifically, for each model, we sample n pairs of current and
voltage data (different DNNs have different n, for the different
time they take to calculate a single image) and then calculate
the average, median, and standard deviation of the power as the
power features. For each model, we repeat the above sampling
and data processing many times to form a power-feature data
set. Finally, we design classifier D and use the data set for
training. To further evaluate the parameters, we set different
sparsity for each model, so the final labels include the model
structure y and parameter sparsity λ.
Our SCA is summarized as Algorithm 1, where we use the
classifier D, voltage array U , and current array I as the inputs,
and then use D to classify and generate the outputs.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we describe the experiments to validate the
effectiveness of our techniques.
A. Experiment setup
To extract valid power data, we use an external data acqui-
sition card running at 400Hz. Fig. 4 shows an example of our
data collection setup.
In this example, we use Alexnet for image classification
and continuously input 24 images (an epoch). The processing
of the DNN requires a large amount of computing resources.
Therefore, the device power increases significantly. We can
Algorithm 1 Side-channel attack (SCA)
Input: Voltage array U = {u1, u2, ..., un} and current array
I = {i1, i2, ..., in} obtained by data acquisition card; The
trained classifier D.
Output: Scalars y and λ representing the prediction results
of the DNN structure and sparsity, respectively.
1: Calculate power: P = U ∗ I = {p1, p2, ..., pn};
2: Obtain the power features:
pmea =
∑n
i=1 pi/n;
pmid = sort(P )[n/2];
pstd =
√∑n
i=1(pi − pmea)2/n.
3: Enter pmea, pmid, pstd into the classifier D to get the
output result:
y, λ = D(pmea, pmid, pstd).
4: Return y, λ.
14000 16000 18000 20000
Sequence number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
V/
A/
W
current
voltage
power
Fig. 4. The trace of using Alexnet to classify an epoch images (24 photos)
on the Raspberry Pi. The classification of 24 images corresponds to the 24
peaks.
observe 24 peaks, corresponding to 24 images processed. Note
that there is a start and end phase when the device runs the
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Fig. 5. Visualization of the power-feature data set. It can be seen that the
power features of different DNN models have a high degree of discrimination.
DNN model. Therefore, we remove those low-power phases
and take the middle part of the data (about 14800to20000
sequence number in the figure) as the input. Due to the
instantaneous nature of the power, in the process of inference,
we divide per five-images’ inference into a group, take all the
power data, calculate their mean, median and variance as the
power-feature data of the model.
We implement six common DNN models on the Raspberry
Pi and test them with the same set of images. After data
acquisition and processing, we obtain a power-feature data set,
divided into 6 categories, as shown in Fig. 5.
B. Architecture identification
In this work, we use machine learning techniques to identify
the DNN architectures. First, we randomly divide the power-
feature data set into training set and testing set with a ratio of
4:1. Here, we simply employ the widely used SVM classifier.
The results on test set are shown in Fig. 6, where the red
bars is the architecture identification accuracies. The average
classification accuracy reaches 96.50%. It should be noted that
we do not intend to compare the performance of different
machine learning algorithms, since this work focus on propos-
ing the overall SCA framework and SVM already achieves
quite high accuracy. By using more advanced algorithms, the
experimental results could be further improved.
In the previous experiment setup, we assume that the pre-
trained DNNs are deployed exactly unchanged. However, this
may not be true in the real-world applications. In general,
many DNN models can be divided into two parts. The first part
is for the feature extraction, such as the convolutional layers
and pooling layers. The second part is for the classification,
such as the fully connected layers. In real-world applications,
the feature extraction part is typically with little or no change
while on the other hand, the classification part is always fine-
tuned based on the actual application.
Therefore, to further explore the performance of our tech-
nique with the changing classification layers, we repeat
the experiment with changing fully connected layer hype-
parameters. We employ three fine-tuning methods for each
original architecture, as shown in Table I, with each archi-
tecture containing four entries. The first one is the original
structure and the others are the fine-tuned ones. The power
traces from all the fined-tuned architectures are mixed with
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Fig. 6. Recognition results for different DNN models. From red bars, it can
be seen that with the power features, the original models can be well identified
by using the SVM algorithm, achieving an average accuracy of 96.50%. From
blue bars, it can been seen that after adding the fine-tuning part, the power
characteristics of different models still have a high degree of discrimination,
achieving an average accuracy of 95.17% .
TABLE I
THE FINE-TUNING STRATEGY FOR THE DNN MODELS.
Models Fine-tuning strategy Hyperparam
Alexnet
Change the number of
the last three layers
4096*4096*1000
4096*4096*500
4096*2048*500
2048*2048*500
InceptionV3
Change the number of
the output layer
1000
750
500
250
Resnet50
Change the number of
the output layer
and the different
building blocks [33]
1000,(3,4,6,3)
1000,(3,6,4,3)
500,(3,6,4,3)
500,(3,5,5,3)
Resnet101
Change the number of
the output layer
and the different
building blocks
1000,(3,4,23,3)
1000,(3,7,20,3)
500,(3,14,13,3)
500,(3,17,10,3)
MobilenetV1
Change the number of
the output layer
1000
750
500
250
MobilenetV2
Change the number of
the output layer
1000
750
500
250
the original ones. Then the architecture identification process
is repeated on the new data set. The classification results for
fine-tuning models are still shown in Fig. 6 (blue bars). The
average performance is slightly reduced to 95.17%, which
demonstrates that our SCA is quite robust even with the fine-
tuning of the classification layers.
7al
ex
ne
t1
.0
al
ex
ne
t0
.8
al
ex
ne
t0
.6
al
ex
ne
t0
.4
in
ce
pt
io
nV
3-
1.
0
in
ce
pt
io
nV
3-
0.
8
in
ce
pt
io
nV
3-
0.
6
in
ce
pt
io
nV
3-
0.
4
re
sn
et
50
-1
.0
re
sn
et
50
-0
.8
re
sn
et
50
-0
.6
re
sn
et
50
-0
.4
re
sn
et
10
1-
1.
0
re
sn
et
10
1-
0.
8
re
sn
et
10
1-
0.
6
re
sn
et
10
1-
0.
4
predicted label
alexnet1.0
alexnet0.8
alexnet0.6
alexnet0.4
inceptionV3-1.0
inceptionV3-0.8
inceptionV3-0.6
inceptionV3-0.4
resnet50-1.0
resnet50-0.8
resnet50-0.6
resnet50-0.4
resnet101-1.0
resnet101-0.8
resnet101-0.6
resnet101-0.4
tru
e 
la
be
l
Fine classification result
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fig. 7. The confusion matrix for the fine classification of DNN models. As we can see, the recognition accuracy of parameter sparsity is lower than that of
the model structure. The average accuracy of the fine classification is 75.88%.
C. Parameter evaluation
The evaluation of the model parameters is also important.
For example, the traditional white-box attack requires full
knowledge of the DNN model, including parameter values.
However, estimating the model parameters are usually quite
challenging. In this work, we assume that pre-trained architec-
tures and partial model parameters could be employed in cer-
tain real-world applications. Moreover, due to the techniques
such as parameter tunings, different models could have varying
sparsity, i.e., the ratio of zeros. We thus use the model sparsity
as features to infer the model parameters.
Specifically, we employ dropout [52] in all the convolutional
and fully connected layers and set different dropout scales to
derive various parameter sparsity. The dropout scale is set to
1.0, 0.8, 0.6, and 0.4, respectively. In this experiment, we select
four DNN models. The classification results of the same model
with varying parameter sparsity are shown in Table II. The
average identification rate is about 76.38%. The Alex network
is relatively hard to identify since it is relatively small and
consumes less power. In general, in the large networks, the
accuracy is well above 82%.
We have performed model architecture and model parameter
estimation. However, these two processes may affect each
other. For example, the varying model sparsity may lead to
wrong identification of the model architecture. Therefore, we
need to check the general model identification results which
include both varying architecture and varying parameters.
Thus, by mixing up the architecture and parameter sparsity
TABLE II
ACCURACY OF THE SAME MODEL IN DIFFERENT PARAMETER SPARSITY
(DROPOUT SCALES).
Models Parameter sparsity Accuracy Average
Alexnet
1.0 88%
54.25%0.8 36%0.6 44%
0.4 49%
InceptionV3
1.0 94%
82.75%0.8 86%0.6 76%
0.4 75%
Resnet50
1.0 100%
84.00%0.8 84%0.6 65%
0.4 87%
Resnet101
1.0 100%
84.5%0.8 64%0.6 88%
0.4 86%
variations, we have a total of 16 different categories in the data
set. The experimental results are shown in Fig 7. The confu-
sion matrix demonstrates that, even with varying parameter
sparsity, we can still get the structure of a DNN model with
relatively high accuracy, i.e., more than 95%. The accuracy of
parameter sparsity recognition under the fine classification task
8is 75.88%, which is reduced a little but generally acceptable.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a side-channel attack (SCA)
method to reveal the internal structure and model parameters
for DNN models. We design a raspberry pi based platform to
derive the power signature of embedded AI devices, and then
use machine learning algorithms to identify the specific DNN
architectures. Moreover, we differ the parameter sparsity to
model the pre-training of DNNs. In general, our technique can
identify both the architecture and model parameters with quite
high accuracy, indicating that we should pay strong attention
to the security problem of many AI applications.
In the future, we will first improve the experimental plat-
form by considering more diverse DNN architectures and
parameters; then, we will use more advanced machine learning
algorithms to identify DNN models more precisely; finally, we
will try to propose defensive strategies to protect the model
information from SCA.
REFERENCES
[1] Y. LeCun, Y. Bengio, and G. Hinton, “Deep learning,” nature, vol. 521,
no. 7553, p. 436, 2015.
[2] Q. Xuan, B. Fang, Y. Liu, J. Wang, J. Zhang, Y. Zheng, and G. Bao,
“Automatic pearl classification machine based on a multistream convo-
lutional neural network,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics,
vol. 65, no. 8, pp. 6538–6547, 2018.
[3] Q. Xuan, Z. Chen, Y. Liu, H. Huang, G. Bao, and D. Zhang, “Multiview
generative adversarial network and its application in pearl classifi-
cation,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, vol. 66, DOI
10.1109/TIE.2018.2885684, no. 10, pp. 8244–8252, Oct. 2019.
[4] L. Wen, X. Li, L. Gao, and Y. Zhang, “A new convolutional neural
network-based data-driven fault diagnosis method,” IEEE Transactions
on Industrial Electronics, vol. 65, DOI 10.1109/TIE.2017.2774777,
no. 7, pp. 5990–5998, Jul. 2018.
[5] Y. Liu, J.-Y. Wu, K. Liu, H.-L. Wen, Y. Yao, S. Sfarra, and C. Zhao,
“Independent component thermography for non-destructive testing of
defects in polymer composites,” Measurement Science and Technology,
vol. 30, DOI 10.1088/1361-6501/ab02db, no. 4, p. 044006, Mar. 2019.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1088%2F1361-6501%2Fab02db
[6] J. Chen, Y. Yang, K. Hu, Q. Xuan, Y. Liu, and C. Yang, “Multiview
transfer learning for software defect prediction,” IEEE Access, vol. 7,
pp. 8901–8916, 2019.
[7] Y. Liu, Y. Fan, and J. Chen, “Flame images for oxygen content prediction
of combustion systems using dbn,” Energy & Fuels, vol. 31, no. 8, pp.
8776–8783, 2017.
[8] Y. Liu, C. Yang, Z. Gao, and Y. Yao, “Ensemble deep kernel learning
with application to quality prediction in industrial polymerization pro-
cesses,” Chemometrics and Intelligent Laboratory Systems, vol. 174, pp.
15–21, 2018.
[9] A. G. Howard, M. Zhu, B. Chen, D. Kalenichenko, W. Wang,
T. Weyand, M. Andreetto, and H. Adam, “Mobilenets: Efficient convo-
lutional neural networks for mobile vision applications,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1704.04861, 2017.
[10] M. Sandler, A. Howard, M. Zhu, A. Zhmoginov, and L.-C. Chen,
“Inverted residuals and linear bottlenecks: Mobile networks for classi-
fication, detection and segmentation,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.04381,
2018.
[11] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan, I. Goodfellow,
and R. Fergus, “Intriguing properties of neural networks,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
[12] I. Evtimov, K. Eykholt, E. Fernandes, T. Kohno, B. Li, A. Prakash,
A. Rahmati, and D. Song, “Robust physical-world attacks on
machine learning models,” CoRR, vol. abs/1707.08945, 2017. [Online].
Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1707.08945
[13] A. Rozsa, M. Gu¨nther, E. M. Rudd, and T. E. Boult, “Facial attributes:
Accuracy and adversarial robustness,” Pattern Recognition Letters, 2017.
[14] V. Mirjalili and A. Ross, “Soft biometric privacy: Retaining biometric
utility of face images while perturbing gender,” in 2017 IEEE Inter-
national joint conference on biometrics (IJCB), pp. 564–573. IEEE,
2017.
[15] M. Melis, A. Demontis, B. Biggio, G. Brown, G. Fumera, and F. Roli,
“Is deep learning safe for robot vision? adversarial examples against the
icub humanoid,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference
on Computer Vision, pp. 751–759, 2017.
[16] N. Akhtar and A. Mian, “Threat of adversarial attacks on deep learning
in computer vision: A survey,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.00553, 2018.
[17] J. Su, D. V. Vargas, and S. Kouichi, “One pixel attack for fooling deep
neural networks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.08864, 2017.
[18] F. Trame`r, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, D. Boneh, and P. McDaniel,
“The space of transferable adversarial examples,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1704.03453, 2017.
[19] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining and harnessing
adversarial examples (2014),” arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572.
[20] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio, “Adversarial examples in the
physical world,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.02533, 2016.
[21] J. Chen, H. Zheng, H. Xiong, and M. Su, “Finefool: Fine object
contour attack via attention,” CoRR, vol. abs/1812.01713, 2018.
[Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1812.01713
[22] P. C. Kocher, “Timing attacks on implementations of diffie-hellman, rsa,
dss, and other systems,” in Annual International Cryptology Conference,
pp. 104–113. Springer, 1996.
[23] P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, and B. Jun, “Differential power analysis,” in Annual
International Cryptology Conference, pp. 388–397. Springer, 1999.
[24] Y. Zhou and D. Feng, “Side-channel attacks: Ten years after its publi-
cation and the impacts on cryptographic module security testing.” IACR
Cryptology ePrint Archive, vol. 2005, p. 388, 2005.
[25] A. Singla, L. Yuan, and T. Ebrahimi, “Food/non-food image classifi-
cation and food categorization using pre-trained googlenet model,” in
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Multimedia Assisted
Dietary Management, pp. 3–11. ACM, 2016.
[26] M. Schwarz, H. Schulz, and S. Behnke, “Rgb-d object recognition
and pose estimation based on pre-trained convolutional neural network
features,” in Robotics and Automation (ICRA), 2015 IEEE International
Conference on, pp. 1329–1335. IEEE, 2015.
[27] Keras, “Using pre-trained models,” https://cran.rstudio.com/web/
packages/keras/vignettes/applications.html, accessed November 18,
2018.
[28] Y. Bengio et al., “Learning deep architectures for ai,” Foundations and
trends® in Machine Learning, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1–127, 2009.
[29] J. Schmidhuber, “Deep learning in neural networks: An overview,”
Neural networks, vol. 61, pp. 85–117, 2015.
[30] A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and G. E. Hinton, “Imagenet classification
with deep convolutional neural networks,” in Advances in neural infor-
mation processing systems, pp. 1097–1105, 2012.
[31] O. Russakovsky, J. Deng, H. Su, J. Krause, S. Satheesh, S. Ma,
Z. Huang, A. Karpathy, A. Khosla, M. Bernstein et al., “Imagenet large
scale visual recognition challenge,” International Journal of Computer
Vision, vol. 115, no. 3, pp. 211–252, 2015.
[32] C. Szegedy, W. Liu, Y. Jia, P. Sermanet, S. Reed, D. Anguelov, D. Erhan,
V. Vanhoucke, and A. Rabinovich, “Going deeper with convolutions,”
in Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern
recognition, pp. 1–9, 2015.
[33] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun, “Deep residual learning for image
recognition,” in Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision
and pattern recognition, pp. 770–778, 2016.
[34] K. Simonyan and A. Zisserman, “Very deep convolutional networks for
large-scale image recognition,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1409.1556, 2014.
[35] R. Girshick, J. Donahue, T. Darrell, and J. Malik, “Rich feature
hierarchies for accurate object detection and semantic segmentation,”
in Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern
recognition, pp. 580–587, 2014.
[36] Y. Chen, T. Luo, S. Liu, S. Zhang, L. He, J. Wang, L. Li, T. Chen,
Z. Xu, N. Sun et al., “Dadiannao: A machine-learning supercomputer,”
in Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium
on Microarchitecture, pp. 609–622. IEEE Computer Society, 2014.
[37] S. Zhang, Z. Du, L. Zhang, H. Lan, S. Liu, L. Li, Q. Guo, T. Chen, and
Y. Chen, “Cambricon-x: An accelerator for sparse neural networks,” in
The 49th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchi-
tecture, p. 20. IEEE Press, 2016.
[38] Y. Yarom and K. Falkner, “Flush+ reload: A high resolution, low noise,
l3 cache side-channel attack.” in USENIX Security Symposium, vol. 1,
pp. 22–25, 2014.
9[39] D. Genkin, A. Shamir, and E. Tromer, “Rsa key extraction via low-
bandwidth acoustic cryptanalysis,” in International cryptology confer-
ence, pp. 444–461. Springer, 2014.
[40] J. Liu, Y. Yu, F. Standaert, Z. Guo, D. Gu, W. Sun, Y. Ge, and X. Xie,
“Small tweaks do not help: Differential power analysis of milenage
implementations in 3g/4g usim cards,” pp. 468–480, 2015.
[41] K. Tiri and I. Verbauwhede, “A vlsi design flow for secure side-
channel attack resistant ics,” in Proceedings of the conference on Design,
Automation and Test in Europe-Volume 3, pp. 58–63. IEEE Computer
Society, 2005.
[42] V. Duddu, D. Samanta, D. V. Rao, and V. E. Balas, “Stealing neural
networks via timing side channels,” CoRR, vol. abs/1812.11720, 2018.
[Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1812.11720
[43] L. Batina, S. Bhasin, D. Jap, and S. Picek, “CSI neural network: Using
side-channels to recover your artificial neural network information,”
CoRR, vol. abs/1810.09076, 2018. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/
abs/1810.09076
[44] L. Wei, Y. Liu, B. Luo, Y. Li, and Q. Xu, “I know what you see: Power
side-channel attack on convolutional neural network accelerators,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1803.05847, 2018.
[45] R. K. Srivastava, K. Greff, and J. Schmidhuber, “Training very deep
networks,” neural information processing systems, pp. 2377–2385, 2015.
[46] S. Ioffe and C. Szegedy, “Batch normalization: Accelerating deep
network training by reducing internal covariate shift,” international
conference on machine learning, pp. 448–456, 2015.
[47] S. Han, H. Mao, and W. J. Dally, “Deep compression: Compressing
deep neural networks with pruning, trained quantization and huffman
coding,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1510.00149, 2015.
[48] S. Han, X. Liu, H. Mao, J. Pu, A. Pedram, M. A. Horowitz, and
W. J. Dally, “Eie: efficient inference engine on compressed deep neural
network,” in Computer Architecture (ISCA), 2016 ACM/IEEE 43rd
Annual International Symposium on, pp. 243–254. IEEE, 2016.
[49] R. Yu, A. Li, C.-F. Chen, J.-H. Lai, V. I. Morariu, X. Han, M. Gao, C.-Y.
Lin, and L. S. Davis, “Nisp: Pruning networks using neuron importance
score propagation,” Preprint at https://arxiv. org/abs/1711.05908, 2017.
[50] H.-J. Kang, “Accelerator-aware pruning for convolutional neural net-
works,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.09862, 2018.
[51] S. Lin, R. Ji, Y. Li, Y. Wu, F. Huang, and B. Zhang, “Accelerating
convolutional networks via global & dynamic filter pruning.” in IJCAI,
pp. 2425–2432, 2018.
[52] G. E. Hinton, N. Srivastava, A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and
R. Salakhutdinov, “Improving neural networks by preventing co-
adaptation of feature detectors,” CoRR, vol. abs/1207.0580, 2012.
[Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.0580
